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Abstract
The article addresses ways in which the Ukrainian protests of late 2013 and early 2014 have been 
covered in mass media. The author focuses, in particular, on the analysis of media-related provo-
cations by identifying and interpreting them in terms of the current concepts and theories such as 
infotainment, social responsibility, and pseudo-events. The article examines ways in which orchestrat-
ed events – more often than not, visually catchy and captivating – are launched, i.e. introduced into 
information space. It also argues a proposition that, as a result of a media event thus staged, polit-
ical attitudes and entire policies can be adjusted through a shift in public opinion both inside and 
outside a country.
“Provocation” has been one of the most frequently heard words during Euro-
Maidan, Ukrainian protests in late 2013 and early 2014, which were recognized at 
one of the EU meetings in Strasbourg as the biggest pro-EU demonstration in the 
entire history of the European Union. This was stated at one of the meetings of the 
EU by Guy Verhofstadt, Belgium’s former prime minister.
However, it was not so much about an individual demonstration as about a so-
cial and political event, or rather a series of events and/or micro-events. These were 
the kind of peaceful rallies and demonstrations which, starting on September 21, 
2013, broke out in various towns and cities and swept much of the country, with 
the epicenter in Kiev, chiefly on Independence Square. All of these events have now 
come to be known as EuroMaidan, since the first wave of anger was triggered by 
a sudden diplomatic U-turn by the Ukrainian government when it cancelled the 
signing of a deal that would lead to closer ties with the EU. The pro-EU Ukrainian 
public was outraged, seeing the move as a betrayal of the country’s foreign-policy 
vector – the course of the European integration is defined in the constitutional law 
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– in favor of closer ties with Russia instead. This was the trigger that made Ukrain-
ians take to the streets.
The article sets out to examine events during EuroMaidan that we categorize as 
provocations, to identify media-related provocations and interpret them in terms 
of the currently popular theories and concepts such as infotainment, social respon-
sibility, and pseudo-events. The author has studied ninety-five media stories with 
the key word “provocation” that appeared on news web resources Kyiv Post, Уніан, 
Кoрpеспондент.net, Українська правда (Ukrainian Truth), LB.ua, and Maidan.
in.ua in the time frame between November 30, 2013 and January 1, 2014.
It is worth pointing out that the word “provocation” vis-a-vis such events has 
become a key term in view of the exclusively peaceful, non-violent nature of the 
protests. Here is an extract from a statement made by the Ukrainian Catholic Uni-
versity (Lviv, Ukraine) whose faculty and students had been actively involved in the 
protests since the very first day:
For us, the community of the Ukrainian Catholic University, who advocate Christian val-
ues, it is inexpressibly sad that in the hearts of a small group of people dwells a desire to 
pay law enforcement officers to shed blood. But revenge is also repugnant – no matter how 
strong the motivation is. We will have the moral right to demand the authorities to take re-
sponsibility for the violence only when we will demand the provocateurs or demonstrators 
who deliberately fueled the bloody confrontation to take responsibility. They placed them-
selves not only outside of the law, but also outside the will of society.
This goes to show that violence is seen as something to be avoided at all costs, 
an instrument that can only come from the outside – by forces that seek to discred-
it peaceful protests.
These forces, which repeatedly brought an unknown number of trained gangs to stage vio-
lent clashes with the police, would like nothing better than a scenario, whereby an imme-
diate introduction of martial law would be inevitable, according to Oksana Zabuzhko, an 
author and public activist.1
The study has shown that the word “provocations” is used with reference to 
a wide range of events. Not all of them, however, are meant to be in the news. The 
website Maidan.in.ua in the section “Provocations” discusses a crackdown in the 
early hours of the morning on November 30, 2013, when Maidan was crushed by 
the “Berkut” riot police and the military. “They hit everybody who was there in-
cluding women (there was one pregnant woman among them)”. Despite the fact 
that people on Maidan had done nothing to provoke the violence, the militia bru-
tally cracked down on the protesters. Qualifying as a provocation, according to the 
same site, is a situation whereby “every Ukrainian rural and city mayor was told to 
find in their locality three athletic men”, who were later sent to Kyiv. Another exam-
1 Statement of the Ukrainian Catholic University on the Violent Suppression of the EuroMaidan 
in Kyiv. Available: http://ucu.edu.ua/eng/news/1712/ [2013, December 2].
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ple of illegal actions was observed in Kharkiv. A woman noticed that the local ad-
ministration was ordering employees from all state-funded organizations and insti-
tutions (hospitals, schools etc.) to attend an anti-EU-meeting.2
“Provocateurs attack journalists” – under this title the site ran a news article 
about twenty journalists and two policemen who were attacked (and beaten up) 
by a number of young athletic men (called titushky in Ukrainian slang), who have 
been compared to the Tontons Macoutes, a paramilitary force that operated in Hai-
ti in the 60s-80s. Titushki are known to have attacked people, harassed journalists 
and suppressed public activities in the recent and not so recent past.3
In all of the cases above, we deal with more or less secretive actions that are not 
meant to find their way into the media. The fact that news about them leaked is ei-
ther accidental or due to the journalistic acumen of the people handling the story.
On the other hand, the story of EuroMaidan included events that give an im-
pression of having been conceived specifically with a view to being extensively cov-
ered. It might be assumed that at least a part of them could have been designed with 
a visually catching TV image in mind. It may be pertinent at this point to turn to 
the Mediatisation theory, which, according to Darren Lilleker, argues that it is the 
media which shapes and frames political communication as well as the society in 
which that communication happens.4
Among the reports about Maidan, the world’s major news channels (CNN, 
EuroNews, and Al Jazeera) gave the most attention to the assault on the President’s 
administration on December 1, 2013. This story received more coverage than any 
other Ukrainian event – Maidan-related or otherwise – in 2013. It was reported 
that participants in protests clashed with police on Bankova Street not far from the 
presidential administration in Kyiv on December 1. Some people wearing masks 
arrived at Bankova Street on a road grader and attempted to break through a po-
lice cordon.5
All the global news channels reported that the activists were behaving aggres-
sively and pelted the police cordon with smoke grenades, stones, metal rods and 
fireworks. Some time later, the law enforcement retaliated, throwing stun and gas 
grenades at the rioters. The clash continued for about three hours, after which the 
Berkut task force cleared Bankova Street of protesters.
Dozens of law enforcement troops, journalists, and demonstrators suffered in-
juries in the incident. The opposition claimed that the attack on the police cordon 
was staged by agent provocateurs bribed by the authorities in an attempt to provoke 
2 O. Zabuzhko, Dear Western friends of Ukraine (also concerns journalists!). Available: https://
www.facebook.com/oksana.zabuzhko [2013, December 1].
3 Available: http://maidan.in.ua/tag/provocations [2013, December 12].
4 Provocateurs attack journalists. Available: http://maidan.in.ua/tag/provocations [2013, 
November 29].
5 D. Lilleker, Key Concepts in Political Communication, London–Thousand Oaks–New Delhi: 




the use of force in dispersing the crowds. A great number of peaceful demonstra-
tors who were not involved in the clashes with police sustained injuries in Berkut’s 
counter-offensive.6 A member of the Batkivschyna parliamentary faction, Hen-
nadiy Moskal, said that the government was plotting provocations against mem-
bers of the main opposition faction in the parliament, journalists and public activ-
ists with the aim of discrediting protesters at the EuroMaidan rally:
A systemic provocation against well-known journalists, members of public organizations, 
and MPs is being prepared. This is done so that the government-controlled media can 
spread reports that it is only terrorists and extremists that operate on Maidan.7
As is apparent, the main objective behind provocations is discrediting Euro-
Maidan as a political phenomenon. Provocations as an instrument for undermin-
ing opponents, on the one hand, are beyond the law (provocation as a criminal 
offence) and, on the other, they are designed to conjure up a visually attractive pic-
ture of scuffles, flaming cars, clashes with the police, etc. We are thus talking about 
a phenomenon that can be best described as a “spectacular criminal provocation”.
The intention behind the ploy was, by orchestrating a visually striking scene, to 
make the television people take the bait; a scene that big mainstream media would 
most probably be willing to broadcast. What we deal with here is a staged event 
which we put in the category of pseudo-events. The latter is known to range from 
peaceful protests to press conferences and from interviews to flash mobs, which 
suggests that pseudo-events do not necessarily have to be provocations. The sim-
plest types of such staged events are a rally, picket or a demonstration. They can be 
instigated and held without an outside agent pulling the strings; they are the result 
of people freely exercising their will, which is fundamental to democracy. If such 
spontaneous acts do reveal an element of “set-up”, it seems, if anything, to be rath-
er amateurish than professional. It involves the participants of the action inventing 
slogans, producing posters etc., which, in their opinion, may attract the attention of 
journalists when the event is being covered by the media.
However, an increased sophistication of political communication has already 
made it standard practice that the design and orchestration of complex pseudo-
events are now within the purview of specially trained advisers, also known as po-
litical strategists or spin-doctors. Darren Lilleker construes a pseudo-event as an 
event that takes place strictly to gain media and public attention. A pseudo-event is 
not an event per se, according to Lilleker. However, it is assigned the task of com-
municating “image-related symbolism to the audience”.8 Although the concept of 
6 Available: http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/court-arrests-nine-suspects-in-riots-
near-presidential-administration-for-two-months-332990.html [2013, December 3].
7 Ibidem.
8 Batkivschyna warns that provocations might be planned on EuroMaidan. Available: http://www.
kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/batkivschyna-warns-that-provocations-might-be-planned-on-euro-
maidan-333249.html [2013, December 8].
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pseudo-events has taken on a whole new dimension, given the scope and complex-
ity of today’s political communication, it has to be noted that the notion itself is 
hardly new.
Daniel J. Boorstin viewed the pseudo-event as a synthetic element of US news 
culture observable as early as the 1920s. Journalists, he noted, would seek out such 
events “to make up for the lack of spontaneous events”.9
While forced to cover the activities of electoral candidates, journalists will of-
ten be subjected to a staged event that diverts coverage from other, less favourable 
events or news items. Equally, candidates from opposing organisations will com-
pete for media coverage by staging events to clash with those of their opponents, 
though, at times this can result in the media’s refusal to cover either. Hence the con-
cern relates to the fact that the news of pseudo-events can drive out news cover-
ing real issues and real events. However, is this always the case? Journalists have the 
power to frame coverage of the event to fit existing news agendas. They also create 
their own events.10
In Baudrillard’s view (1993), pseudo-events, while not being real, “represent 
a simulation of reality (...) stupefying range of images that present us with a false 
reality of life beyond our homes”.11 It appears that the concept of pseudo-events 
has both journalists and academics locked in heated debate. Yet the authors above 
talk about pseudo-events that operate within the legal framework. These can be 
interpreted in terms of the so-called “white PR”. The events of Ukrainian Euro-
Maidan, by contrast, are more like dark or “black PR” (negative public relations, 
also called dark public relations – DPR12), since what takes place is clearly outside 
the law. To extrapolate the term to pseudo-events, one can talk about “black pseu-
do-events”, meaning events that were arranged and carried out by means of illegal 
methods. Resorting to such methods constitutes an offense that carries criminal li-
ability. In the set-ups described above, in particular, one can detect a method of 
a punishable “spectacular provocation”.
The first day of 2014 was marked by another spectacular provocation, which, 
luckily, was thwarted. Unknown men attempted to set fire to the electrical room 
of the Unions Building (the National Resistance Headquarters) on the ninth floor. 
Here is how Stepan Kubiv, an MP and one of the commandants of the Unions Build-
ing, describes what happened on the evening of January 1, 2014:
Unknown men had sneaked in unseen and climbed to the ninth floor of the 
building, which houses the electrical room. The provocateurs drilled a hole to the 
room, which was, without exaggeration, a lifeline for thousands who spend days 
9 D. Lilleker, Key Concepts..., p. 165.
10 D. Boorstin, The Image: A Guide to Pseudo-Events in America, New York: Vintage 1961, p. 9.
11 J.  Clarke, How journalists judge the reality of an international pseudo-event, “Journalism”, 
2003, 4(1), p. 50–75.





and weeks on Maidan and depend on electricity for food and heating. The men 
then inserted a rope – soaked in gasoline and ignited – through the hole into the 
electrical room.
The attempted arson attack was spotted by Maidan guards, volunteers who 
guard the Maidan grounds. Within a few minutes of discovering the fire, they ex-
tinguished it. The arsonists, however, were not apprehended.13
Would it be safe to say that the intended event would have qualified as a “spec-
tacular” pseudo-performance, had it not been stymied? I am inclined to think that 
it would. Had everything gone according to plan, from the provocateurs’ perspec-
tive, the fire might have destroyed the entire building, not only the electrical room. 
I should add here that the protesters took hold of the Unions Building without per-
mission, as was the case, incidentally, with the Orange Revolution. Only later did 
the leadership of the National Resistance manage to negotiate a lease with the ad-
ministration of the building, i.e. to legalize the unlawful occupancy. However, on 
New Year’s eve, that same administration refused to renew the lease.
It is probably not far-fetched to assume that the attempted arson attack was car-
ried out to accomplish several objectives:
1. To disable communications and cut protesters off from electricity supply.
2. To discredit the leadership of the National Resistance in the eyes of the 
rank-and-file by casting them in an unfavorable light (How could they not 
have taken proper care of the communications when their right to use the 
building was dubious, at the very least?). Besides, if they couldn’t protect the 
Unions Building, what might be expected if they were entrusted with a far 
greater responsibility?
3. In the event of a fire sweeping through the entire building, world’s television 
networks would be bound to broadcast spectacular footage of the Nation-
al Resistance headquarters in flames. One can be justified in assuming that 
whoever was behind it (pro-government strategist) was planning to damage 
(if not destroy altogether) the reputation of Maidan and its supporters.
Another provocation – although on a somewhat smaller scale – that happened 
on that same day, occurred during a torch march that was conducted by the all-
Ukrainian national association Svoboda and other forces of the radical right to 
mark the anniversary of the birth of Stepan Bandera, a figure that remains contro-
versial to this day both in and outside of Ukraine.
What Svoboda’s press service referred to as a provocation took place in the 
evening, when someone participating in the march hurled burning flames at the 
central entrance of Premier Palace hotel. It turned out that two young men who 
were responsible for it were indeed Svoboda party members, although they were 
reportedly expelled from the association immediately after what happened. Fol-
13 M.  Wattenberg, Negative Campaign Advertising: Demobilizer or Mobilizer, eScholarship 
Repository, UC Irvine, Department of Politics and Society. Retrieved on January 29, 2005.
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lowing the incident, the Kyiv police opened a criminal case on hooliganism charg-
es against the two men.
As emerges from the statement issued by the Svoboda public relations depart-
ment, the party leadership does not believe its activists had instigated the arson at-
tempt, noting instead that they “had swallowed the bait”. Incidentally, the footage of 
the incident distinctly shows a man with a microphone addressing the participants 
of the torch procession, who called the hotel a contemporary brothel and clearly 
encouraged “sending them [the hotel – B.P.] our warmest regards with fireworks, 
smoke bombs and the like”. According to the opposition, therefore, this unidenti-
fied man was a specially trained provocateur and that the Svoboda association con-
demns the provocation. Upon a closer examination of the incident, a decision was 
taken to expel from the association the two members who allowed themselves to be 
involved in the incident.14
In the above-described incident, the spectacular staged event – the attempt-
ed arson of the entrance to a hotel – was meant to undermine the reputation of the 
right within the Euro-Maidan political spectrum, an intention which, incidental-
ly, was attested in a blog post on Українська правда (Ukrainian Truth) by Andriy 
Okara, a political strategist and political scientist:
While Svoboda intellectuals go around Kyiv setting fire to the entrances of luxury hotels 
making for excellent video footage for Russian and Western news channels and contribut-
ing to stories along the lines of ‘Ukrainian Maidan-esque fascism posing ultimate threat to 
mankind’, EuroMaidan has found itself in grave danger, but this time the danger is to do 
with information working against it.15
On the other hand, the authorities have launched counterattacks by imitating 
the tactics that the opposition has employed: accusing the other side of provocations.
With exactly this purpose in mind, the authorities have resorted to a special 
category of people:
At one time, in Kyiv near subway Voksalna (Ukr. Railway station), unknown persons gath-
ered homeless people and gave 80 gryvnya to each of them. They wanted these people to 
go to EuroMaidan to ‘chant and kill’.16
In December 2013, Tetiana Chornovol, a journalist known for her investiga-
tions of massive abuse of power by the ruling party (Party of Regions) and expo-
sés of corrupt practices by government officials, was brutally beaten after she spent 
a day taking pictures of the residencies of Interior Minister Vitaliy Zakharchenko 
14 Available: http://zaxid.net/home/showSingleNews.do?u_kiyivskomu_budinku_profspilok_
poperedili_sprobu_pidpalu&objectId=1300269 [2014, January 2].
15 Statement issued by Svoboda press service. Available: http://www.svoboda.org.ua/diyalnist/
novyny/046138 [2014, January 2].
16 A. Okara, Russian loans and cheap gas – only in exchange for elimination of Maidan? Available: 




and Prosecutor General Viktor Pshonka. The opposition and human rights activ-
ists accused the authorities of being behind the assault. However, even well before 
the investigation, the pro-government Party of Regions alleged that what happened 
was in the interests of the opposition. Mykola Dzyha, a Party of Regions member, 
claimed:
It seems that provocations against activists are convenient for the opposition as an attack 
on a pro-European activist would give a much-needed boost to Maidan at a time when it 
is quickly losing momentum. With this, they would be getting a new opportunity to shout 
about ‘reprisals’ and ‘political repressions’ and by so doing rally their supporters, who are 
by now growing weary of a lack of activity on Maidan.17
We are, therefore, close to a conclusion that of all pseudo-events, there is a dis-
tinctly identifiable category, which – on account of its very spectacularity – is spe-
cifically designed for widespread media coverage. This coverage usually aims at 
modifying political decisions by bringing about a shift in public opinion both in-
side the country and abroad. The considerable media potential that such events 
have makes people in charge of them resort to any methods and techniques availa-
ble to them, including ones that are outside the law.
In other words, the model of the impact of spectacular criminal provocations 
that we have described is based on the assumption that modern commercial mass 
media, especially television, cannot resist putting on the air sensational, visually 
striking material, like the 9/11 events of 2001 or other terror attacks. So here is how 
it happens. To begin with, let us try to get inside the mind of a person that intends 
to mislead the public by manipulation. The first thing to do would be to try and vis-
ualize an event that could ”do the job”, preferably one of brutal and violent charac-
ter, which is capable of having a desirable political impact, for example, by causing 
outrage or fear in a part of their audience. Then the plan is put into action. In the 
Ukrainian scenario, it involved hiring people specifically for the purpose of provo-
cations. This meant brutally attacking police (riot police) and even using a bulldoz-
er (brought here in advance specifically for this purpose) in front of the president’s 
administration. Their calculation was that these acts would also “inspire” peaceful 
protesters to join in. Once some of the protesters did “swallow the bait” and got in-
volved, the provocateurs vanished into thin air and even hid behind the riot police, 
who, importantly, played along. They acted (the police) as if the provocateurs were 
not there. Instead, the police started beating up the activists and even passers-by, 
who had had nothing to do with it. As a result, over 100 people got injured, some 
of them seriously. Interestingly enough, not only the protesters swallowed the bait, 
but even the media people (cameramen, TV reporters etc.). As a consequence, this 
footage showing uncontrollably wild mobs, which almost immediately appeared on 
all news channels, prepared the world public opinion that if the government were 
17 Available: http://maidan.in.ua/page/10 [2013, December 13].
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to declare a state of emergency, it would be completely justified. This perception by 
the world would be exactly what the “script-writers” had in mind.
What will, no doubt, strike the reader as odd about this model is the media con-
stituent, which appears to be one that is the most rigid, inflexible, and unchanging. 
If we were to use the metaphor of Internet phishing here, mass media – in a kind of 
pun – comes across as a big ‘fish’, which is prepared to swallow just about anything, 
as long as it is sensational, shocking and visually striking enough. Here it might be 
a good idea to make a reference to Neil Postman’s seminal book Amusing Ourselves 
to Death, which discusses television and makes a point that TV, as a medium, by 
virtue of its very nature, cannot be altered, improved upon just because it consti-
tutes pure infotainment. “Indeed, we may have reached the point where cosmet-
ics has replaced ideology”.18 If we were to expand Postman’s observation, it might 
be safe to argue that television is not only about amusing ourselves, but also about 
scaring ourselves to death.
To sum up, this model is made up of four basic elements: (1) the idea that is 
conceived by a spin doctor; (2) the execution of the idea through staging a “scene” 
in a maximally attention-grabbing and visually irresistible manner (importantly, it 
should unfold in front of the rolling cameras, as was the case with Maidan. It was 
there that most news agencies and TV channels were located and what happened 
was right in front of their lenses). If the “performance” goes according to the spin-
doctor’s plan, the media will swallow the bait and the picture will be all over the 
news and it will become a “player” in successive politics by informing attitudes to-
ward the Ukrainian issue. As a result, the U.S. State Secretary John Kerry, for ex-
ample, to the delight of the spin doctor(s) and the polical mastermind(s) behind it, 
will issue a statement urging utmost restraint on BOTH sides, which is exactly what 
the ruling political elites need as it, in equal measure, discredits the opponents of 
the regime as well.19
This situation, however, begs the question of why respectable news networks 
are unable to resist the temptation of broadcasting provocateur-orchestrated visual-
ly attractive footage? We will confine ourselves to an interpretation of this situation 
in terms of the theory of infotainment. The visual appeal seems to be given prece-
dence over everything else, which can be explained by:
a) distorted tastes and preferences of the viewing public, which wishes to ap-
proach news as a kind of entertainment, including where it is not only amus-
ing but also scary;
b) the fact that there always exists a risk of the popularity of the television 
channel going down, which necessarily entails reduced advertising. This is-
18 N. Postman, Amusing Ourselves to Death: Public Discourse in the Age of Show Business, New 
York: Penguin Books, 1986, p. 4.
19 Statement on Events in Ukraine. Available: http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/12/ 




possible in the event of a more analytical coverage of the news and a more 
rigorous filtering of the visually attractive, if factually dubious, information.
This by no means suggests that the public should not demand that journalists 
pay closer attention to the footage and pictures they receive, no matter how enter-
taining and appealing they may seem. It is exactly what the Ukrainian public is do-
ing, in particular through the words of Oksana Zabuzhko, a Ukrainian writer and 
public figure who we quoted earlier: 
Please stop being sensationalist, and don’t be so fast at spreading rumours on “the rally in 
Kiev getting violent”. By your sensation-hunting, you play, without your own awareness, 
along the scenario of the coup spin-doctors: namely, you prepare in advance the public 
opinion of your countries “for the worst”. Please be very cautious about ANY bit of “pro-
violence” information that you might get. Ukrainian civil society is now seriously tested 
on its maturity, and its capacity for self-organization, and the last thing we need is being 
manipulated over through the world media – even if in all the good will.20
The subject of the social responsibility of the media in covering Ukrainian Eu-
roMaidan will become the topic of further study. I will add here, however, that even 
the most respectable news channels, such as CNN or Euronews, in reporting the 
events of December 1, 2013, did not act, from what I observed, in accordance with 
the principles of socially responsible media. As one may know, the theory postu-
lates that “it is no longer enough to report the fact truthfully. It is now necessary to 
report the truth about the fact”.21 This is exactly the approach that supposedly un-
derlies reporting and editorial policy of the afore-mentioned channels. However, 
with respect to the above-described events of December 1, these channels, at best, 
reported the facts truthfully, meaning that they showed a visually spectacular pic-
ture, which, in fact, was nothing other than a spectacular pseudo-event. The infor-
mation policies pursued by these channels lead us to place CNN and Euronews – 
on an abstract scale between the theory of social responsibility of the media on one 
end and the infotainment theory on the other – closer to infotainment. At the same 
time, we are fully aware that such a conclusion may be somewhat premature as it is 
based on the limited analysis of several news reports. Further investigation of the 
issues discussed here will follow shortly.
20 O. Zabuzhko, Dear Western friends...
21 F.S. Siebert, T. Peterson, W. Schramm, Four Theories of the Press, Urbana: University of Illinois 
Press, 1973, p. 88.
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